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ABSTRACT
Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that
are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based en-
vironments, where they have been used to recover secret
keys from cryptographic implementations. One common ap-
proach to thwart cache-based attacks is to use constant-time
implementations, i.e. which do not branch on secrets and do
not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. How-
ever, there is no rigorous proof that constant-time implemen-
tations are protected against concurrent cache-attacks in
virtualization platforms with shared cache; moreover, many
prominent implementations are not constant-time. An alter-
native approach is to rely on system-level mechanisms. One
recent such mechanism is stealth memory, which provisions
a small amount of private cache for programs to carry po-
tentially leaking computations securely. Stealth memory in-
duces a weak form of constant-time, called S-constant-time,
which encompasses some widely used cryptographic imple-
mentations. However, there is no rigorous analysis of stealth
memory and S-constant-time, and no tool support for check-
ing if applications are S-constant-time.
We propose a new information-flow analysis that checks
if an x86 application executes in constant-time, or in S-
constant-time. Moreover, we prove that constant-time (resp.
S-constant-time) programs do not leak confidential infor-
mation through the cache to other operating systems exe-
cuting concurrently on virtualization platforms (resp. plat-
forms supporting stealth memory). The soundness proofs
are based on new theorems of independent interest, includ-
ing isolation theorems for virtualization platforms (resp. plat-
forms supporting stealth memory), and proofs that constant-
time implementations (resp. S-constant-time implementa-
tions) are non-interfering with respect to a strict information
flow policy which disallows that control flow and memory ac-
cesses depend on secrets. We formalize our results using the
Coq proof assistant and we demonstrate the effectiveness of
our analyses on cryptographic implementations, including
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cache-based attacks are side-channel attacks in which a
malicious party is able to obtain confidential data through
observing cache accesses of programs. They are particularly
effective in cloud-based environments, where hardware sup-
port is virtualized and shared among tenants. In such set-
tings, a malicious tenant can manage that an operating sys-
tem under its control co-resides with the operating system
which executes the program that the attacker targets. This
allows the attacker to share the cache with its victim and to
make fine-grained observations about its own cache hits and
misses; using this knowledge, the attacker can then success-
fully retrieve confidential data of the program. Cache-based
attacks are widely applicable, but are specially devastating
against cryptographic implementations that form the secu-
rity backbone of many Internet protocols (e.g. TLS) or
wireless protocols (e.g. WPA2). Known targets of cache-
based attacks include widely used implementations of AES,
DES, ECDSA and RC4.
Simple approaches for protecting oneself against cache-
based attacks are flushing the cache on every context switch
and disabling the cache mechanism for critical computa-
tions. The first one was formally analyzed in [11]. In addi-
tion, both approaches suffer from severe performance penal-
ties [17, 48].
Another approach is to build implementations that do not
leak information through the cache. One common strategy is
to make implementations constant-time1, i.e. do not branch
on secrets and do not perform memory accesses that which
depend on secrets. There exist constant-time implemen-
tations of many cryptographic algorithms, including AES,
1The terminology is inherited from cryptography, where it is
generally used for source level programs that do not branch
on secrets and do not perform array accesses with indices
that depend on secrets. Because the property intends to
characterize the behavior of program executions on concrete
architectures, rather than in abstract operational models, we
focus on low-level languages, and on a variant of constant-
time expressed in terms of addresses (which consist of base
addresses plus offsets) instead of arrays.
DES, RC4, SHA256, TEA, and Salsa20, and even RSA,
as well as general techniques for turning implementations
of cryptographic algorithms constant-time. However, and
quite astonishingly, there is no rigorous proof that constant-
time algorithms are protected against cache-based attacks
when executed concurrently on virtualization platforms with
shared cache. Moreover, many cryptographic implementa-
tions such as PolarSSL AES, DES, and RC4 make array
accesses that depend on secret keys and are not constant-
time.
A different more permissive approach is to allow imple-
mentations that are not constant-time, but to deploy system-
level countermeasures that prevent an attacker from drawing
useful observations from the cache. Some of these mecha-
nisms are transparent to applications, but sacrifice perfor-
mance: instances include flushing the cache at each context
switch [48] or randomizing its layout [50]. Other mechanisms
are not transparent, and must be used correctly, either via
APIs or via compilers that enforce their correct usage. One
lightweight such mechanism is stealth memory [29, 34]; in
contrast to many of its competitors, stealth memory can be
implemented in software, does not require any specific hard-
ware and does not incur a significant performance overhead.
Informally, stealth memory enforces a locking mechanism
on a small set of cache lines, called stealth cache lines, saves
them into (protected) memory and restores them upon con-
text switches, thereby ensuring that entries stored in stealth
cache lines are never evicted, and do not leak information.
From an abstract perspective, memory accesses to stealth
addresses, i.e addresses that map to stealth cache lines, be-
come “hidden” and have no visible effect. Thus, applica-
tions can perform memory accesses that depend on secrets
without revealing confidential information, provided these
accesses are done on stealth addresses. This induces a re-
laxation of constant-time, which we call S-constant-time: an
implementation is S-constant-time if it does not branch on
secrets and only memory accesses to stealth addresses may
depend on secrets. Although early work on stealth memory
suggests that several prominent cryptographic implementa-
tions meet the requirements of S-constant-time, this class
has not been considered formally before, and in particular,
there is no rigorous security analysis of S-constant-time al-
gorithms, and no mechanism to ensure that assembly code
makes a correct usage of stealth addresses.
Our contributions. We undertake the first rigorous study
of constant-time and S-constant-time implementations. We
prove that such implementations are protected against cache-
based attacks in virtualized platforms where their support-
ing operating system executes concurrently with other, po-
tentially malicious, operating systems. Moreover, we pro-
vide support for deploying constant-time or S-constant time
applications, in the form of type-based enforcement mech-
anisms on x86 implementations; the mechanisms are inte-
grated into CompCert, a realistic verified compiler for C [38].
Finally, we experimentally validate our approach on a set of
prominent cryptographic implementations. To achieve these
goals, we make the following contributions:
1. We define an analysis for checking if x86 applications
are constant-time. Our analysis is based on a type system
that simultaneously tracks aliasing and information flow.
For convenience, we package our analysis as a certifying com-
piler for CompCert. Our certifying compiler takes as input
Example LoC CT SCT Stealth cache (KB)
Salsa20 1077 X
SHA256 419 X
TEA 70 X
AES 744 X 4
Blowfish 279 X 4
DES 836 X 2
RC4 164 X 0.25
Snow 757 X 6
A check in the CT or SCT column respectively indicates
whether programs are constant-time or S-constant-time. For
the latter, the last column gives the amount of stealth cache
required to run the application. All constant-time applica-
tions are also S-constant-time with 0KB stealth cache.
Figure 1: Selected experimental results
a C program whose confidential data is tagged with an an-
notation High, and transforms the program into annotated
x86 assembly code, which can be checked for constant-time.
2. We provide the first formal proof that constant-time
programs are protected against cache-based attacks in vir-
tualization platforms. The proof contemplates a very strong
threat model with a malicious operating system that controls
the scheduler, executes concurrently with the operating sys-
tem on which the victim application runs, and can observe
how the shape of the cache evolves throughout execution.
3. As a first key step in the proof, we prove that constant-
time programs is non-interfering with respect to an informa-
tion flow policy which mandates that the control flow and
the sequence of memory accesses during program execution
do not depend on secrets. The policy is captured using an
operational semantics of x86 programs where transitions are
labelled with their read and write effects.
4. As a second key step in the proof, we prove isolation
between operating systems in virtualization platforms. The
proof is based on a model of virtualization that accounts
for virtual addresses, physical and machine addresses, mem-
ory mappings, page tables, TLBs, and cache, and provides
an operational semantics for a representative set of actions,
including reads and writes, allocation and deallocation, con-
text and mode switching, and hypercalls. The isolation the-
orem states that an adversary cannot distinguish between
two execution traces of the platform in which the victim op-
erating system performs two sequences of actions that have
the same visible effects.
5. We extend our analysis and formal proofs to S-constant-
time. As a significant contribution of the extension, we ob-
tain the first rigorous security analysis of stealth memory.
6. We formalize our results in the Coq proof assistant
(over 50,000 lines of Coq). The formalization is based on
the first formal model of stealth memory. The model is a
significant development in itself (over 10,000 lines of Coq)
and is of independent interest.
7. We successfully evaluate the effectiveness of our frame-
work on several cryptographic implementations, including
AES, DES, and RC4 from the PolarSSL library, and SHA256,
Salsa20. Figure 1 provides a selection of results.
Full version. Additional details are available in the full
version of the paper [12].
2. SETTING
Our first step is to define static analyses for enforcing
constant-time (and variants) on x86 programs. Our anal-
ysis is built on top of CompCert [38], a formally verified,
optimizing C compiler that generates reasonably efficient
assembly code for x86 platforms (as well as PowerPC and
ARM). In addition to being a significant achievement on
its own, CompCert provides an excellent platform for devel-
oping verified static analyses. We take specific advantage
of two features of CompCert: i. its memory model, which
achieves a subtle and effective compromise between exposure
to machine-level representation of memory and tractability
of formal proofs, and is ideal for reasoning about properties
that relate to sequences of memory accesses; ii. its sophisti-
cated compilation chain, which involves over 15 passes, and
about 10 intermediate languages, which are judiciously cho-
sen to provide compact representations on which program
analyses can be verified.
Our goal is to implement static analyses for checking whether
programs perform conditional jumps or memory accesses
that depend on secrets, and to derive strong semantical
guarantees for the class of programs accepted by one of our
analyses. In order to obtain meaningful results, it is impor-
tant that our analyses are performed on intermediate repre-
sentations towards the end of the compilation chain, rather
than source C programs; indeed, some compilation passes
in the compiler middle-end (typically at RTL level) may
typically modify and reorder memory accesses and hence
a constant-time C program could well be transformed into
a non constant-time x86 program, or vice-versa. Therefore,
we settle on defining our analysis on one of the final in-
termediate forms. A natural representation for reasoning
about sequences of memory accesses is Mach, the last-but-
final intermediate language in the compilation chain. The
Mach language is used after passes that may introduce new
memory accesses (such as register allocation, branch tunnel-
ing and layout of the activation records for procedure calls),
and immediately before generation of assembly code. Hence
the sequence of memory accesses at Mach and assembly lev-
els coincide. Moreover, Mach has a compact syntax, which
is important to reduce proof effort. On the other hand, the
Mach language does not enjoy a control flow graph represen-
tation, which is a drawback for performing static analyses.
We therefore adopt a minor variant of Mach, which we call
MachIR, that retains the same instruction set as Mach but
makes explicit the successor(s) of each instruction. MachIR
is an idoneous representation for building verified static anal-
yses about sequences of memory accesses of programs.
Syntax. A MachIR program p is represented by a (par-
tial) map of program nodes to instructions, i.e. as an el-
ement of N ⇀ I. Each instruction carries its successor(s)
node(s) explicitly. The most basic instructions manipulate
registers and perform conditional and unconditional jumps:
op(op,~r , r ,n) (register r is assigned the result of the oper-
ation op on arguments ~r ; next node is n), goto(n) (uncon-
ditional jump to node n) and cond(c,~r ,nthen ,nelse) (condi-
tional jump; next node is nthen or nelse depending on the
boolean value that is obtained by evaluating condition c on
arguments ~r). Memory is manipulated trough two oper-
ations: loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n) (register r receives the content
of the memory at an address that is computed with ad-
dressing mode addr and arguments ~r ; next node is n) and
N ∋ n CFG nodes
R ∋ r register names
S ∋ S global variable names
A ∋ addr ::=
| based(S) based addressing
| stack(δ) stack position
| indexed indexed addressing
O ∋ op ::=
| addrof(addr) symbol address
| move register move
| arith(a) arithmetic operation
I ∋ instr ::=
| op(op,~r , r ,n) register operation
| loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n) memory load
| storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n) memory store
| goto(n) static jump
| cond(c,~r ,nthen ,nelse) conditional static jump
Figure 2: Instruction set
storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n) (the content of the register r is stored
in memory at an address that is computed with addressing
mode addr and arguments ~r ; next node is n). ς describes
the type of memory chunk that is accessed (of size 1, 2 or
4 bytes). Addressing based(S) (resp. stack(δ)) directly de-
notes the address of a global symbol (resp. of the stack
memory block). Pointer arithmetic is performed through
addressing mode indexed. Additional instructions are used
to access the activation record of a procedure call, and to
perform the call. Figure 2 gives an excerpt of the language
instruction set.
Semantics. Values are either numeric values Vnum(i) or
pointer values Vptr(b, δ) with b a memory block name and
δ a block offset. We let &SP denote the memory block that
stores the stack. A state (n, ρ, µ) is composed of the current
CFG node n, the register bank ρ ∈ R→ Val and a CompCert
memory µ ∈Mem.
The operational semantics is modelled with judgments:
s ֒
a
−→ s
′
The semantics is implicitly parameterized by a program p.
Informally, the judgment above says that executing the pro-
gram p with state s leads to a state s′, and has visible effect
a, where a is either a read effect read x (with x an address),
or a write effect write x, or the null effect ∅. Note that ef-
fects model the addresses that are read and written, but not
their value. Figure 3 presents selected rules of the seman-
tics. Note that an instruction like store4(stack(δ), [], r ,n
′)
will assign the four stack positions δ, δ+ 1, δ+ 2 and δ+ 3.
3. A TYPE SYSTEM FOR CONSTANT-TIME
This section introduces a type-based information flow anal-
ysis that checks whether a MachIR program is constant-
time, i.e. its control flow and its sequence of memory ac-
cesses do not depend on secrets. To track how dependencies
evolve during execution, the information flow analysis must
be able to predict the set of memory accesses that each in-
struction will perform at runtime. However, instructions
p[n] = op(op,~r , r ,n ′)
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
∅
−→ (n
′, ρ[r 7→ JopK(ρ,~r)], µ)
p[n] = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr µ[vaddr]ς = v
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
read vaddr−−−−−−−−→ (n
′, ρ[r 7→ v], µ)
p[n] = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr store(µ, ς, vaddr, ρ(r)) = µ
′
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
write vaddr−−−−−−−−−→ (n
′, ρ, µ′)
Figure 3: Mach IR semantics (excerpts)
such as storeς(indexed, [r1; r2], r ,n
′) do not carry this infor-
mation. The standard solution to recover this information is
to let the information flow analysis use the results of another
static analysis that performs these computations. There are
several possible choices that achieve different trade-offs be-
tween expressiveness, precision, and simplicity. We opt for
a conventional points-to [7] analysis. A similar analysis has
already been formalized for the CompCert toolchain [43], but
it targets a different language (RTL) and makes a different
trade-off between efficiency and precision; we use our own
formalization here.
Alias (points-to) type system. The definition of the alias
type system is given in [12]. For the purpose of understand-
ing the rest of the paper, it is sufficient to know that the
type system computes statically the points-to information
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) at every node n for a memory access
with an addressing mode addr and arguments ~r . Hence,
if node n contains an instruction loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′) or an
instruction storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′), we have a prediction, at
compile time, of the targeted memory address. In this con-
text, a so-called points-to information is one of the follow-
ing: i. Symb(S), which represents pointer values Vptr(b, δ)
such that b is equal to the memory address &S of the global
variable S; ii. Stack(δ), which represents the pointer value
Vptr(&SP, δ).
For example, if an instruction storeς(indexed, [r1; r2], r ,n
′)
is performed at node n when r1 contains Vptr(&S, 8) and
r2 contains the integer 16, the points-to static analysis may
safely predict PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Symb(S), because the
accessed pointer is Vptr(&S, 24).
Information flow type system. Next, we define an infor-
mation flow type system for constant-time. As usual, we
consider a lattice of security levels L = {Low,High} with
Low ⊑ High. Initially, the user declares a set X0h ⊆ S of high
variables.
Programs are assigned types (Xh, T ), where Xh ∈ S → L
is a global type, and T ∈ N → (N + R) → L is a mapping
from program nodes to local types. Xh is a flow-insensitive
global type which assigns a security level Xh(S) for every
global variable S ∈ S. T is a flow-sensitive local type which
assigns for every offset δ ∈ N the security level T [n](δ) of the
stack cell at address Vptr(&SP, δ) and node n, and for every
register r ∈ R its security level T [n](r) at node n. Formally,
the type system manipulates judgments of the form:
Xh ⊢ n : τ1 ⇒ τ2
p(n) = op(op,~r , r ,n ′)
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ [r 7→ τ(~r)]
p(n) = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Symb(S) τ(~r) = Low
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ [r 7→ Xh(S)]
p(n) = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Stack(δ)
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ [r 7→ τ(δ) ⊔ · · · ⊔ τ(δ + ς − 1)]
p(n) = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Symb(S)
τ(~r) = Low τ(r) ⊑ Xh(S)
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ
p(n) = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Stack(δ)
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ [δ 7→ τ(r), . . . , δ + ς − 1 7→ τ(r)]
p(n) = goto(n ′)
Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ
Figure 4: Information flow rules for constant-time
where Xh is a global type, n is a node, and τ1 and τ2 are
local types, i.e. τ1, τ2 ∈ (N + R) → L. The type system
enforces a set of constraints on X0h, Xh and T . Typing rules
are given in Figure 4; we note τ(~r) for
⊔
r∈~r τ(r).
The rule for op(op,~r , r ,n ′) simply updates the security
level of r with the supremum of the security levels of ~r .
There are two rules for loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′). The first one
considers the case where the value is loaded from a global
variable S. In this case, the typing rule requires that all
registers are low, i.e. τ(~r) = Low, as we want to forbid
memory accesses that depend on a secret. The security level
of the register r is updated with the security level Xh(S)
of the variable. The second rule considers the case where
the value is loaded from a stack position at offset δ. In
this case, our type system conservatively requires that the
memory access is constant (and statically predicted by the
alias type system). In this case, no information is leaked.
Note that the security level of the register r is set to the
maximum of τ(δ), . . . , τ(δ+ ς−1). Indeed, the security level
of τ(δ) models the level of the 8-bits value at position δ; if
the load is performed with a memory chunk of size strictly
bigger than 1, several 8-bits value will be accessed. Our type
system takes care of this subtlety.
The two typing rules for store are similar to the rules for
load. If the store is performed on a global variable, we again
require τ(~r) = Low to make sure the dereferenced pointer
does not leak secrets. The constraint τ(r) ⊆ Xh(S) propa-
gates the security level of the stored value. For a store on
a stack offset, we again make sure to consider enough stack
offsets by considering the memory chunk of the instruction.
Definition 1 (Constant-time programs).
A program p is constant-time with respect to a set of vari-
ables X0h, written X
0
h ⊢ p, if there exists (Xh, T ) such that
for every S ∈ X0h, Xh(S) = High and for all nodes n and all
its successors n′, there exists τ such that
Xh ⊢ n : T (n)⇒ τ ∧ τ ⊑ T (n
′)
where ⊑ is the natural lifting of ⊑ from L to types.
We automatically inferXh and T using Kildall’s algorithm [33].
4. SOUNDNESS OF TYPE SYSTEM
We capture the soundness of the static analyses with re-
spect to two distinct non-interference properties. The first
property is expressed relative to the operational semantics
of MachIR (or equivalently x86) programs, and capture a
passive and non-concurrent attacker. This property is simi-
lar to non-interference results as they arise in the literature
on language-based security, and serves as a key step towards
the second property. The latter is cast relative to the oper-
ational semantics of a virtualization platform, and captures
an active and adaptive adversary. For the sake of readabil-
ity, this section defines the security policies, relates them
informally to existing threat models, and provides informal
soundness statements. Formalization details are deferred to
Section 6 and to the appendices.
4.1 Language-level security
Our first soundness result establishes a non-interference
property based on the semantics of MachIR programs. We
assume given for every pair (Xh, τ) consisting of a global
type and a local type an equivalence relation∼Xh,τ on states.
Informally, two states s and s′ are equivalent if they have the
same program counter, and their bank registers and memory
mappings coincide on their low part. Given a typing deriva-
tion for p with witness (Xh, T ), equivalence can be extended
to traces2 of p as follows:
θ = s0 ֒
a0−→ s1 ֒
a1−→ s2 ֒
a2−→ s3 . . .
θ′ = s′0 ֒
a′
0−→ s
′
1 ֒
a′
1−→ s
′
2 ֒
a′
2−→ s
′
3 . . .
are equivalent, written θ ∼Xh,T θ
′, iff i = 0 . . . ai = a
′
i and
si ∼Xh,T (pci) s
′
i, where pci denotes the program counters of
si and s
′
i (which in particular must coincide).
We say that a program p verifies LL non-interference
w.r.t. X0h, written LLNIX0
h
(p), iff for every two traces θ and
θ′ obtained by executing p from initial states s and s′:
s ∼Xh,T (pc0) s
′ =⇒ θ ∼Xh,T θ
′
Note that the definition is parameterized by (Xh, T ).
LL non-interference accurately captures the intended goal
of constant-time: indeed, it ensures that programs have the
same control flow and perform the same sequence of memory
accesses for every pair of executions starting from equivalent
initial states.
Proposition 2 (Language-level security).
If a program p is typable, i.e. X0h ⊢ p, then p is LL non-
interfering, i.e. LLNIX0
h
(p).
Proposition 2 states that constant-time programs verify LL
non-interference with respect to the set of secrets X0h. It
proves security against a weak, passive attacker, which can
observe the sequence of memory accesses and program coun-
ters during program execution, but cannot observe the pro-
gram memory, or interleave the program’s execution with
2We allow infinite traces. Later, we introduce partial traces,
which are necessarily finite. Moreover, we assume that s0
and s′0 are initial states, i.e. their program counter is set to
a distinguished entry point pc0.
execution of code of its choice. Although we do not es-
tablish a connection formally, this model is closely related
to a system-level attacker model, called the non-concurrent
attacker model. In this model, the attacker is a malicious
operating system oa that co-resides with the operating sys-
tem ov on which the victim program executes. The attacker
initially performs some computations, for instance to set the
cache in a state of his choice. Then, the hypervisor performs
a context switch and makes the victim operating system ac-
tive, so that the victim program executes uninterruptedly.
Upon termination of the victim program execution, the hy-
pervisor performs a context switch; the attacker becomes
active again, and tries to guess from its accumulated obser-
vations the secret material, e.g. the secret cryptographic
keys, manipulated by the victim program.
4.2 System-level security
Our second soundness theorem establishes a non-interference
property for a much stronger model, called the concurrent
attacker model. The setting of this attacker model is sim-
ilar to the non-concurrent attacker model, and considers a
virtualization platform with a malicious operating system
oa and the victim operating system ov on which a victim
program p executes. However, this model assumes that the
attacker is both active and adapative. More explicitly, oa
and ov execute concurrently under a scheduler controlled by
oa, which decides at each step to execute a sequence of steps
of its choice, to force resolution of a pending hypercall, or
to switch context in order to give control to the victim ov.
Furthermore, the attacker oa can observe finely the struc-
ture of the cache during execution, but cannot read into
the memory of ov, or read in the cache the values of en-
tries belonging to ov. At each step, the attacker oa can use
its previous observations to decide how to proceed. This
model significantly generalizes the non-concurrent attacker
model captured by language-level security and in particular
captures the class of access-driven attacks, in which the at-
tacker makes fine-grained observations about the sequence
of cache hits and misses.
Formally, we model the attacker model on top of an oper-
ational semantics of the virtualization plaform. The seman-
tics is built on top of a rich memory model that accounts
for virtual, physical, and machine addresses, memory map-
pings, page tables, TLBs (translation lookaside buffers), and
VIPT (virtually indexed physically tagged) cache. Formally,
the semantics is modelled as a labelled transition system:
t ֒
b
−→ t
′
where t, t′ range over states and b is an action. Informally, a
labelled transition as above indicates that the execution of
the action b by o in an initial state t leads to a new state t′.
Figure 9 provides a representative set of actions considered,
including reads and writes, extending or restricting memory
mappings, (un)registering memory pages, context and mode
switching, and hypercalls. Each action b has an effect eff(b);
see Figure 9 for examples of effects. As in the language-
level setting, the visible effects of reads and writes record
the addresses that are read and written, but not their value.
Then, we model the attacker as a function A that takes as
input a partial trace and returns either a tag v if the attacker
lets the victim operating system perform the next step of
execution, or an action of its choice that it will execute in the
next step. Since the choice of the attacker can only depend
on its view of the system, we define an equivalence relation
∼ on partial traces, and require that A is compatible with ∼,
i.e. A(θ) = A(θ′) for every partial traces θ and θ′ such that
θ ∼ θ′. Equivalence between partial traces is defined from
equivalence ∼ on states (itself defined formally in Section 6):
θ = t0 ֒
b0−→ t1 ֒
b1−→ t2 ֒
b2−→ . . . ֒
bn−1
−−−→ tn
θ′ = t′0 ֒
b′
0−→ t
′
1 ֒
b′
1−→ t
′
2 ֒
b′
2−→ . . . ֒
b′
n′−1
−−−−→ t
′
n′
are equivalent, written θ ∼ θ′, iff n = n′, and for i = 0 . . . n−
1, ti ∼ t
′
i, and if the active OS of ti is ov then eff(bi) = eff(b
′
i)
else if the active OS of ti is oa then bi = b
′
i.
Given an attacker A and a victim program p, one can de-
fine the concurrent execution (A ‖ p)[t] of A and p with ini-
tial state t; informally, (A ‖ p)[t] is the system trace that
interleaves execution of p by ov and adversarially-chosen
code by oa according to the adversarially-chosen schedul-
ing policy—both captured in the definition of A. Formally,
(A ‖ p)[t] is defined recursively: given a partial trace θ for
the concurrent execution, one computes A(θ) to determine
whether the next action to be executed is the attacker action
A(θ), in case A(θ) 6= v, or the next step in the execution of
p, in case A(θ) = v.
Given a program p and a set of initial secrets X0h, we
define an equivalence relation ∼X0
h
on system states; the
relation is implicitly parameterized by a mapping of MachIR
(or equivalently x86) states to platform states. We say that
a program p verifies SL non-interference w.r.t. an initial
set of high variables X0h, written SLNIXh(p), iff for every
attacker A and initial states t and t′:
[t ∼X0
h
t′ ∧ t ∼ t′] =⇒ (A ‖ p)[t] ∼ (A ‖ p)[t′]
Proposition 3 (System-level security).
If If a program p is typable, i.e. X0h ⊢ p, then p is SL non-
interfering, i.e. SLNIX0
h
(p).
Proposition 3 states that constant-time programs verify SL
non-interference with respect to the set of secrets X0h. It
proves security against a strong, active attacker, which can
interleave the program’s execution with execution of code of
its choice.
5. EXTENSIONS TO S-CONSTANT-TIME
We now outline an extension of the results of the previ-
ous section that accounts for stealth memory. Informally
stealth memory provides a distinguished set of stealth ad-
dresses such that reading or writing from these addresses has
no visible effect. We reflect this property of stealth memory
by relaxing the type system to allow secret-dependent mem-
ory accesses on stealth addresses. The modified typing rules
now involve a set Xs of addresses that must be mapped to
stealth memory. The main typing rules are now given in
Figure 5. Note that there is no requirement that stealth
addresses are high; in practice, stealth addresses often store
public tables.
Definition 4 (S-constant-time). A program p is S-
constant-time with respect to a set of variables X0h and a set
of stealth addresses Xs, written Xs, X
0
h ⊢ p, if there exists
(Xh, T ) such that for every S ∈ X
0
h, Xh(S) = High and for
all nodes n and all its successors n′, there exists τ such that
Xs, Xh ⊢ n : T (n)⇒ τ ∧ τ ⊑ T (n
′)
where ⊑ is the natural lifting of ⊑ from L to to types.
p(n) = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Symb(S)
τ(~r) = High =⇒ S ∈ Xs
Xs, Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ [r 7→ τ(~r) ⊔Xh(S)]
p(n) = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
PointsTo(n, addr ,~r) = Symb(S)
τ(~r) = High =⇒ S ∈ Xs τ(~r) ⊔ τ(r) ⊑ Xh(S)
Xs, Xh ⊢ n : τ ⇒ τ
Figure 5: Information flow rules for S-constant-time
p[n] = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr vaddr /∈ Xs µ[vaddr]ς = v
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
read vaddr−−−−−−−−→ (n
′, ρ[r 7→ v], µ)
p[n] = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′) JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr
vaddr /∈ Xs store(µ, ς, vaddr, ρ(r)) = µ
′
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
write vaddr−−−−−−−−−→ (n
′, ρ, µ′)
p[n] = loadς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′)
JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr vaddr ∈ Xs µ[vaddr]ς = v
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
∅
−→ (n
′, ρ[r 7→ v], µ)
p[n] = storeς(addr ,~r , r ,n
′) JaddrK(ρ,~r) = vaddr
vaddr ∈ Xs store(µ, ς, vaddr, ρ(r)) = µ
′
(n, ρ, µ) ֒
∅
−→ (n
′, ρ, µ′)
Figure 6: Modified IR semantics (excerpts)
We automatically infer Xs, Xh and T using Kildall’s algo-
rithm.
LL non-interference is extended to the setting of stealth
memory simply by considering a modified labelled opera-
tional semantics (see Figure 6) where accessing variables in
Xs has no visible effect; the notion of state equivalence re-
mains unmodified. Below we let LLNIXs,X0h
denote the re-
sulting policy.
Proposition 5 (Language-level security).
If Xs, X
0
h ⊢ p then LLNIXs,X0h
(p).
Given a program p, a set of initial secrets X0h, and a set of
stealth addresses Xs, we define an equivalence relation ∼X0
h
on system states; the relation is implicitly parameterized by
a mapping of MachIR (or equivalently x86) states to plat-
form states that map elements of Xs to stealth addresses.
We say that a program p verifies SL non-interference w.r.t.
an initial set of high variables X0h and a set of stealth ad-
dresses Xs, written SLNIXs,X0h
(p), iff for every attacker A
and initial states t and t′:
[t ∼X0
h
t′ ∧ t ∼ t′] =⇒ (A ‖ p)[t] ∼ (A ‖ p)[t′]
Proposition 6 (System-level security).
If Xs, X
0
h ⊢ p then SLNIXs,X0h
(p).
6. FORMALIZATION
In this section, we outline the formalization of the proof of
system-level security for S-constant-time. We first describe
our model of virtualization; then we state an isolation theo-
rem; finally, we sketch how SL non-interference follows.
Simplifications. Wemake several simplifications. The most
relevant ones are listed next: i. we take an abstract view of
page tables as mappings; ii. we abstract away implementa-
tion details such as encoding and size of values, and assume
given an abstract type Value of values with a distinguished
element ⊥ to denote undefined values; iii. we consider a sin-
gle stealth address; iv. we do not model registers. These
simplifications do not impact the security analysis.
Policies. Our model and henceforth results are parame-
terized by a write policy and a replacement policy for the
cache. They can be instantiated respectively to write back
and write through, and to all typical replacement policies,
such as LRU, pseudo-LRU or LFU.
Memory model. States (SLST) are modelled as 6-tuples
that respectively store data about operating systems and
about the active operating system, the memory, the hyper-
visor mapping, the cache and the TLB (translation lookaside
buffer); the formal definition appears in Figure 7.
There are three levels of address spaces: virtual addresses,
which are handled by guest operating systems (OSs) and
processes, physical addresses, a software abstraction used
to provide the illusion of hardware memory to each guest
OS and machine addresses, which refer to actual hardware
memory. Some virtual and machine addresses are marked
as stealth.
The first component of a state records for each OS, drawn
from a set OSId of OS identifiers: i. a physical address
pointing to its current page table; ii. its pending hyper-
call. Hypercalls are priviledged functionalities exported by
the hypervisor to the guest OSs; there is at most one pending
hypercall per OS.
The second component of a state stores the current active
operating system (ActiveOS) together with its activity mode.
The active OS is either running or waiting for a hypercall
to be resolved.
The third component of the state stores the platform mem-
ory (Memory). The memory is modelled as a function from
machine addresses to memory pages; contrary to separation
kernels, pages are allocated on demand. Each page contains:
.i an owner (PageOwner); .ii a flag indicating whether the
page can be cached or not3; .iii a content (PageContent).
A page owner is either the hypervisor or a guest OS; pages
may not have owners. The page content is either a read-
able/writable value or an OS page table. Page tables are
used by guest OSs for mapping the virtual addresses used
by running applications to machine addresses. Neither ap-
plications nor guest OSs have permission to read or write
page tables; these actions can only be performed by the hy-
pervisor.
The fourth component of the state stores the hypervisor
mapping (HyperMap). This mapping is used to translate
physical page addresses to machine page addresses and is
under control of the hypervisor, which can allocate and deal-
locate machine memory.
3To properly deal with the problems posed by aliasing in
VIPT caches, pages mapped by two different virtual ad-
dresses are flagged as non-cacheable.
The fifth component of the state stores a Virtually In-
dexed Physically Tagged (VIPT) data cache (Cache). The
cache is used to speed up data fetch and store, and con-
sists of a collection of data blocks or cache lines that are ac-
cessed by cache indices. The cache consists of: i. a bounded
map4 from pairs of virtual and machine addresses to mem-
ory pages, ii. a history (used by the replacement policy) and,
iii. a static mapping from virtual addresses to cache indices.
Each entry is tagged with a machine address. This avoids
the need of flushing the cache on every context switch. Since
caches are usually set associative, there are many virtual ad-
dresses that map to the same index. All data that is accessed
using the same index is called a cache line set. We select one
cache index and one particular virtual address (stealth va)
in its cache line set for stealth use. All other virtual ad-
dresses in that cache line set are reserved and cannot be
used either by the guest operating systems or the hypervi-
sor. It is relatively straightforward to extend the definitions
to a set of stealth addresses.
The final component of the state stores the Translation
Lookaside Buffer (TLB), which is used to improve virtual ad-
dress translation speed. The TLB is modelled as a bounded
map from virtual to machine addresses. It is used in conjunc-
tion with the current page table of the active OS to speed
up translation of virtual to machine addresses. The TLB is
flushed on context switch and updates are done simultane-
ously in the page table, so its management is simpler than
the cache (we do not need to record the TLB access history,
as it is not necessary to write back evicted TLB entries).
State invariants. The model formalizes a notion of valid
state that captures several well-formedness conditions, and
an exclusion property, which is crucial for proving isolation,
and ensures that stealth and non-stealth addresses cannot
be mapped to the same cache line set. Both properties are
preserved by execution; for exclusion, this is achieved by a
careful treatment of allocation in the operational semantics.
Platform semantics. Our formalization considers a repre-
sentative set of actions to read and write from memories,
manage memory mappings, request and perform priviledge
actions, and switch between operating systems and the hy-
pervisor; see Figure 9. Figure 10 presents the semantics
of two important actions: write (write value in virtual ad-
dress) and new_sm (extends the stealth memory of the active
OS with a new mapping).
We use some helper functions to manipulate the compo-
nents of the state. These functions are explained in the
description of the actions semantics. There is, for example,
a function cache add that is used to add entries in the cache.
It returns the new cache and an optional entry selected for
replacement. The function cache add is parameterized by
an abstract replacement policy that determines which ele-
ments are evicted from a full cache, and guarantees that
the inertia property, as defined in [34], holds for the cache:
when adding an entry to the cache in a virtual address va, if
an eviction occurs, the evicted address is in the same cache
line set as va.
4A bounded map is a finite map whose domain must have
size less than some fixed positive constant.
Va,Pa,Ma virtual, physical and machine address
OSId OS identifier
HC ::= new | del | lswitch| pin | unpin | none hyper calls
OSData ::= Pa× HC OS data
GuestOSs ::= OSId→ OSData guest OSs
OSActivity := running | waiting exec modes
ActiveOS ::= OSId× OSActivity active OS
PageContent := RW (Value) | PT (Va→ Ma) | none page content
PageOwner := Hyp | OS(OSId) | none page owner
Page := PageContent× PageOwner × Bool memory page
Memory ::= Ma→ Page memory map
HyperMap ::= OSId→ Pa→ Ma hypervisor map
CacheData := Va×Ma 7→ Page cache data
CacheIndex := Va→ Index cache index
CacheHistory := Index→ Hist cache history
Cache ::= CacheData× CacheIndex× CacheHistory VIPT cache
TLB ::= Va 7→ Ma TLB
SLST ::= GuestOSs× ActiveOS× HyperMap×Memory × Cache× TLB System level state
Figure 7: System level state
Attacker model and state equivalence. We let the at-
tacker observe: i. its current page table; ii. its pending
hypercalls; iii. the identity of the active operating system;
iv. its activity when active; v. its own readable/writable
memory pages; vi. the values of its own cache entries; vii. the
memory layout of the victim, as defined by the page meta-
data (owner and cacheable status) of the victim memory
pages; viii. the layout of the non-stealth part of the cache;
ix. the cache history. The attacker cannot, however, directly
read, write, or observe page table or the hypervisor map-
pings (either its own or the victim). This is because these
mappings are maintained by the hypervisor, and guest OSs
have no access to them. Moreover, the attacker cannot ob-
serve the values held in the memory or cache entries of the
victim. This very strong adversary model captures the kind
of attacks we are interested in: if two states differ in one
of these observable components, the execution of an action
might replace an attacker entry in the cache, potentially
leading to a cache-based attack. On the other hand, we
prove that if an action is executed in two states that are
equivalent from the attacker’s view, the attacker cache en-
tries are equal in the resulting states.
Dynamic allocation is a known difficulty when reasoning
about state equivalence; in our setting, the difficulty man-
ifests itself in the definition of equivalence for memory and
hypervisor mappings. In an object-oriented setting, this dif-
ficulty is normally solved using partial bijections [9]. How-
ever, we model both memory allocation and deallocation via
the pin and unpin actions; unfortunately, the partial bijec-
tion approach breaks in this setting5 and we do not know
any formal proof of soundness of an information flow type
system for a language with allocation and deallocation. For-
tunately, we can define state equivalence without using par-
tial bijections; instead, we rely on the hypervisor mapping
physical addresses, which are the same in both executions.
5The approach requires that the partial bijection grows dur-
ing execution. With deallocation, one would require that the
final partial bijection is a superset of a subset of the original
one, which is vacuous.
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Figure 8: Equivalence of hypervisor mappings
Formally, state equivalence ∼ is defined as the conjunc-
tion of four equivalence relations for OS information, cache
history, hypervisor mapping, and memory mapping. The
first two relations are straightforward. We define equiva-
lence of hypervisor mappings below; equivalence of memory
is defined similarly.
Definition 7 (Equivalence of hypervisor mappings).
Two states t and t′ have equivalent hypervisor mappings for
the attacker (t ∼hyp t′) if for every physical address pa,
readable/writable page pg and machine address ma:
• if get page hyp(t, oa, pa) = (ma, pg), there exists ma
′
such that get page hyp(t′, oa, pa) = (ma
′, pg);
• if get page hyp(t, ov, pa) = (ma, pg), and no page table
maps stealth va to ma, then there exists ma′ such that
get page hyp(t′, ov, pa) = (ma
′, pg′), where pg and pg′
are equal except in their contents;
and reciprocally for t′.
Figure 8 provides a pictural representation of the equiva-
lence: we require that the attacker readable/writable pages
are the same for hyp and hyp′. Furthermore, the layout
of the non-stealth memory pages of the victim must be the
same (non-stealth pages should have the same owner, and
same cacheable flag, but arbitrary value).
Unwinding lemmas. The equivalence relation ∼ is kept
invariant by the execution of a victim stealth action. Fur-
thermore, if the same attacker action or two victim actions
with the same effect are executed in two equivalent states,
the resulting states are also equivalent. These results are
variations of standard unwinding lemmas [44]. In the sequel,
we write tov and toa respectively to denote states where ov
and oa are the active operating system.
Lemma 8 (oa step-consistent unwinding). Assume
soa1 ֒
a
−→ s
′
1, and s
oa
2 ֒
a
−→ s
′
2. If s1 ∼ s2 then s
′
1 ∼ s
′
2.
Lemma 9 (ov step-consistent unwinding). Assume
sov1 ֒
a
−→ s
′
1, and s
ov
2 ֒
a′
−→ s
′
2. If eff(a) = eff(a
′) and s1 ∼ s2,
then s′1 ∼ s
′
2.
The proofs of these lemmas critically rely on the inertia
property of cache [34]: upon adding a virtual address to the
cache, the evicted virtual address, if any, is in the same cache
line set as the added one; and on the exclusion property: the
hypervisor ensures that guest operating systems can only
allocate virtual addresses that are not in the same cache
line set as the stealth virtual addresses.
Isolation. We first define a relation to capture that two
traces perform the same sequence of actions from the at-
tacker’s view:
eff(b1) = eff(b2) Θ1 ≈ Θ2
tov1 ֒
b1−→Θ1 ≈ t
ov
2 ֒
b2−→Θ2
Θ1 ≈ Θ2
toa1 ֒
b
−→Θ1 ≈ t
oa
2 ֒
b
−→Θ2
We then define equivalence of traces:
t1 ∼ t2 Θ1 ∼ Θ2
tov1 ֒
b1−→Θ1 ∼ t
ov
2 ֒
b2−→Θ2
t1 ∼ t2 Θ1 ∼ Θ2
toa1 ֒
b
−→Θ1 ∼ t
oa
2 ֒
b
−→Θ2
Theorem 10 (OS isolation). Let Θ and Θ′ be execu-
tion traces such that Θ ≈ Θ′. If t1 ∼ t
′
1, with t1 and t
′
1 the
first states of traces Θ and Θ′ respectively, then Θ ∼ Θ′,
i.e. Θ and Θ′ are indistinguishable traces for the attacker
system oa.
The proof of the theorem follows from the unwinding lemmas
by co-induction on the execution traces.
System-level security for S-constant-time. We define a
relation between MachIR instructions and system-level ac-
tions, such that an instruction is related to an action if they
have the same effect. In order to do this we use a mapping
from language variables to virtual addresses that guarantees
that program variables marked as stealth by the type system
are mapped to stealth addresses in the platform. The rela-
tion between instructions and actions is naturally extended
to programs and traces. With this extended relation, we
define the concurrent execution of an attacker and a victim
program ((A ‖ p)[t]), and state Proposition 5. The proof
of this proposition is a direct consequence of Theorem 10,
and shows that S-constant-time programs are protected to
cache-based attacks in virtualization platforms.
7. EVALUATION
We have tested the effectiveness of our type systems on
two sets of examples. The first set of examples consists
of small programs that violate the constraints of constant-
time algorithms, e.g. branch on secret values. The second
set of examples consists of a representative set of crypto-
graphic implementations, including some that are vulnerable
to cache-based attacks on common platforms, and constant-
time algorithms that were specifically designed to avoid such
attacks. In all cases, we picked standard and publicly avail-
able implementations of the constructions, and after per-
forming very minor modifications of the code6, compiled
them using CompCert, and run our certified type system
on the MachIR (or equivalently x86) programs output by
the compiler. Figure 1 summarizes the list of examples an-
alyzed, and provides in each case the number of variables
marked as stealth, and the amount of stealth memory that
is required to execute the program securely.
AES. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmet-
ric encryption algorithm that was selected by NIST in 2001
to replace DES. AES is now used very widely and is antic-
ipated to remain the prevailing blockcipher for the next 20
years. Although NIST claimed the selected algorithm re-
silient against side-channels, AES is a prominent example
of an algorithm in which the sequence of memory accesses
depend on the cryptographic key.
Most applications of AES require that encryption and de-
cryption be very efficient; therefore, the AES specification
advises using S-boxes and other lookup tables to bypass ex-
pensive operations, such as arithmetic in the field GF(28).
As a result of using S-boxes, most AES implementations are
vulnerable to cache-based attacks, and fail to comply with
even the weakest security guarantees. In 2005, Bernstein [17]
reports on a simple timing attack which allows to recover
AES keys by exploiting the correlation between execution
time and cache behavior during computation. Shortly af-
terwards, Tromer, Osvik, and Shamir [48] report on several
cache-based attacks against AES, including an effective at-
tack that does not require knowledge of the plaintexts or the
ciphertexts. Further improvements are reported by Bonneau
and Mironov [19], Aciic¸mez, Schindler and Koc¸ [2], and Can-
teaut, Lauradoux and Seznec [21]. More recently, Bangerter,
Gullasch and Krenn [30] report on a new cache-based attack
in which key recovery is performed in almost real-time, and
Ristenpart et al [42] show that cache-based attacks are not
confined to closed systems, and can be realized in cloud ar-
chitectures based on virtualization. In a different line of
work, Kasper and Schwabe [31] report on a constant-time
implementation of AES.
As a testcase for our approach, we have applied our S-
constant-time type system to the PolarSSL implementation
of AES. Our type system is able to prove that 4kB of stealth
memory is sufficient to execute AES securely.
DES and BlowFish. Data Encryption Standard (DES) and
BlowFish are symmetric encryption algorithms that were
widely used until the advent of AES. They are designed un-
der the same principles as AES, and their implementation
also relies on S-boxes. Cache-based attacks against DES
and BlowFish are reported by Tsunoo et al [49] and Kelsey
et al [32] respectively. We have applied our S-constant-
time type system to PolarSSL implementations of both al-
gorithms; again, our tool proves that only a small amount
of stealth memory (resp. 2kB and 4kB) is required for the
programs to execute securely.
6We have modified some examples to declare some arrays
as global. This is a consequence of the relative coarseness
of the alias analysis, and could be solved by formalizing a
more precise value analysis.
SNOW. Snow is a stream cipher used in standards such as
the 3GPP encryption algorithms. Its implementation relies
on table lookups for clocking its linear feedback shift register
(LFSR). Cache-based attacks against SNOW—and similar
LFSR-based ciphers—are reported by Leander, Zenner, and
Hawkes [37]. We have applied our S-constant-time type sys-
tem on an ECRYPT implementation of SNOW; our tool
proves that SNOW can be executed securely with 6kB of
stealth memory.
RC4. RC4 is a stream cipher introduced by Rivest in 1987
and used in cryptographic standards such as SSL and WPA.
It is based on a pseudo-random generator that performs ta-
ble lookups. Chardin, Fouque and Leresteux [22] present a
cache-based attack against RC4. Analyzing the PolarSSL
implementation of RC4 with our S-constant-time type sys-
tem proves that the program can execute securely with only
0.25kB of stealth memory.
TEA, Salsa20, SHA256. We have applied our constant-
time type system to some cryptographic algorithms that
carefully avoid performing table lookups with indices depen-
dent on secrets: Tiny Encryption Algorithm, a block cipher
designed by Needham and Wheeler; Salsa20, a stream ci-
pher designed by Bernstein, and SHA256. For the latter,
we consider the input to be secret, with the intention to
demonstrate that SHA256 is suitable to be used in pass-
word hashing. In all cases, our type system establishes that
the programs are secure without using stealth memory.
RSA. RSA is a widely used encryption algorithm. We have
applied our constant-time type system to implementations
of modular exponentiation. As expected, our type system
rejects implementations that branch on secrets and accepts
constant-time implementations.
8. RELATED WORK
Side-channel attacks in cryptography. In [36], Kocher
presents a pratical timing attack on RSA and suggests that
many vectors, including the cache, can be exploited to launch
side-channel attacks. Aciic¸mez and Schindler [1] demon-
strate that not only data cache, but also instruction cache
attacks are also effective. Over the last decade, researchers
have developed abstract models of cryptography that cap-
ture side-channels, and developed constructions that are se-
cure in these models, see e.g. [28] for a survey.
Analysis tools for cache-based attacks. CtGrind7 is an
extension of ValGrind that can be used to check automati-
cally that an implementation is constant-time.
CacheAudit [26] is an abstract-interpretation based frame-
work for estimating the amount of leakage through the cache
in straightline x86 executables. CacheAudit has been used
to show that several applications do not leak information
through the cache and to compute an upper bound for the
information leaked through the cache by AES. These guar-
antees hold for a single run of the program, i.e. in the
non-concurrent attacker model. A follow-up [14] provides
7It was developed circa 2010 by Adam Langley and is avail-
able from https://github.com/agl/ctgrind/.
an upper bound for the leakage of AES in an abtract ver-
sion of the concurrent attacker model; however, the bound
is only valid under strong restrictions, e.g. on scheduling.
Moreover, the results of [14] cannot be used to assert the se-
curity of constant-time programs against concurrent cache
attacks.
Language-based protection mechanisms. Many authors
have developed language-based protection methods against
side-channel attacks. Agat [3] defines an information flow
type system that only accepts statements branching on se-
crets if the branches have the same pattern of memory ac-
cesses, and a type-directed transformation to make programs
typable. Molnar et al [40] define the program counter model,
which is equivalent to path non-interference, and give a pro-
gram transformation for making programs secure in this
model. Coppens et al [24] use selective if-conversion to re-
move high branches in programs. Zhang et al [51] develop
a contract-based approach to mitigate side-channels. En-
forcement of contracts on programs is performed using a
type system, whereas informal analyses are used to ensure
that the hardware comply with the contracts. They prove
soundness of their approach. However, they do not consider
the concurrent attacker model and they do not provide an
equivalent of system-level non-interference. Stefan et al [47]
also show how to eliminate cache-based timing attacks, but
their adversary model is different.
More recently, Liu et al [39] define a type system that an
information flow policy called memory-trace non-interference
in the setting of oblivious RAM. Their type system has sim-
ilar motivations has ours, but operates on source code and
deals with a different attacker model.
OS verification. OS verification is an active field of re-
search [46]. One recent breakthrough is the machine-checked
refinement proof of an implementation of the seL4 microker-
nel [35]. Subsequent machine-checked developments prove
that seL4 enforces integrity, authority confinement [45] and
intransitive non-interference [41]. The formalization does
not model cache nor side-channel attacks.
Dam et al [25] formally verify information flow security
for a simple separation kernel for ARMv7. The verification
is based on an extant model of ARM in HOL, and relates an
ideal model in which the security requirements hold by con-
struction with a real model that faithfully respects the sys-
tem behavior. Extending the approach to handle the cache
is left for further work.
Our model of virtualization is inspired from recent work [11]
which proves isolation in an idealized model of virtualization
with a shared cache. However their model is based on a vir-
tually indexed virtually tagged (VIVT) cache and assumes
that the cache implements a write through policy, and is
flushed upon context switch; thanks to these assumptions,
the cache is always consistent with the memory of the cur-
rent operating system. This coincidence allows lifting with-
out much difficulty the isolation result of earlier work [10],
which does not consider the cache. In particular, the un-
winding lemmas of [10] can be used mutatis mutandis, with-
out the need to be reproved in this extended setting. In
comparison, our notion of state equivalence is significantly
more involved, and as a result the proof of isolation is far
more complex.
Stealth memory. Stealth memory is introduced in [29] as
a flexible system-level mechanism to protect against cache-
based attacks. This flexibility of stealth memory is con-
firmed by a recent implementation and practical evalua-
tion [34]. The implementation, called StealthMem, is based
on Microsoft Hyper-V hypervisor, and is reasonably efficient
(around 5% overhead for the SPEC 2006 benchmarks and
less than 5% for cryptographic algorithms). Both [29, 34]
lack a rigorous security analysis and language-based support
for applications.
Verified cryptographic implementations. There is a wide
range of methods to verify cryptographic implementations:
type-checking, see e.g. [18], deductive verification, see e.g. [27],
code generation, see e.g. [20] and model extraction, see e.g. [4].
However, these works do not consider side-channels. Re-
cently, Almeida et al [5] extend the EasyCrypt framework [13]
to reason about the security of C-like implementations in
idealized models of leakage, such as the Program Counter
Model, and leverage CompCert to carry security guarantees
to executable code; moreover they, instrument CompCert
with a simple check on assembly programs to ensure that
a source C program that is secure in the program counter
model is compiled into an x86 program that is also secure
in this model.
Verified compilation and analyses. CompCert [38] is a
flagship verified compiler that has been used and extended
in many ways; except for [5], these works are not concerned
with security. Type-preserving and verifying compilation are
alternatives that have been considered for security purposes;
e.g. Chen et al [23] and Barthe et al [16] develop type-
preserving compilers for information flow.
Formal verification of information flow analyses is an ac-
tive area of research; e.g. Barthe et al [15] and Amtoft et
al [6] formally verify type-based and logic-based methods
for enforcing information flow policies in programs. More
recently, Azevedo et al [8] formally verify a clean-slate de-
sign that enforces information flow.
9. FINAL REMARKS
Constant-time cryptography is an oft advocated solution
against cache-based attacks. In this work, we have devel-
oped an automated analyzer for constant-time cryptography,
and given the first formal proof that constant-time programs
are indeed protected against concurrent cache-based attacks.
Moreover, we have extended our analysis to the setting of
stealth memory; to this end, we have developed the first for-
mal security analysis of stealth memory. Our results have
been formalized in the Coq proof assistant, and our analyses
have been validated experimentally on a representative set
of algorithms. One direction for future work is to extend our
analysis to constant-time programs which branch on secrets.
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Action Informal description Effect
read va Guest OS reads virtual address va ∅ if va is Stealth
read va otherwise
write va val Guest OS writes value val in va ∅ if va is Stealth
write va otherwise
new va pa Hypervisor extends non-stealth memory of active OS with va 7→ ma new va pa
new_sm stealth va pa Hypervisor extends stealth memory of active OS with stealth va 7→ ma ∅
switch o Hypervisor sets o to be active OS switch o
lswitch pa Hypervisor changes the current memory mapping of active OS to be pa lswitch pa
hcall c An OS requires privileged service c to be executed by the hypervisor hcall c
chmod Hypervisor gives the execution control to active OS chmod
page_pin pa t Memory page corresponding to pa is registered and classified with type t page_pin pa t
page_unpin pa Memory page of active OS that corresponds to pa is un-registered page_unpin pa
Figure 9: Selected actions and their effects
Action write va val
Guest OS writes value val in va
Rule
aos act = (aos, running)
get page mem(t, va) = (ma, pg)
pg = (RW ,OS aos, b) pg = (RW val,OS aos, b)
cache add(cache, va,ma, pg) = (cache′, (ma′, pg′))
mem[ma′ := pg′][ma := pg]pol = mem
′
tlb[va := ma] = tlb′
t = (oss, aos act, hyp,mem, cache, tlb)
t′ = (oss, aos act, hyp,mem′, cache′, tlb′)
t ֒
write va val
−−−−−−−−−→ t
′
aos act = (aos, running)
get page mem(t, va) = (ma, pg)
pg = (RW ,OS aos, b) pg = (RW val,OS aos, b)
cache add(cache, va,ma, pg) = (cache′,⊥)
mem[ma := pg]pol = mem
′ tlb[va := ma] = tlb′
t = (oss, aos act, hyp,mem, cache, tlb)
t′ = (oss, aos act, hyp,mem′, cache′, tlb′)
t ֒
write va val
−−−−−−−−−→ t
′
Precondition The action write va val requires that the
active OS aos is running. Furthermore, the virtual ad-
dress va is mapped to a machine address ma and a read-
able/writable page pg in the current page table of the active
OS (get page mem).
Postcondition There are two rules for the write action,
one in which an entry is evicted from the cache when the writ-
ten page is added, and the other in which no entry is evicted.
In both cases the resulting state differs in the value val of the
page associated to the pair (va,ma) in the cache cache, and
in the TLB tlb. If cache add returns an entry (ma′, pg′) that
was evicted from the cache, the memory in ma′ is updated
with pg′. The final value in memory of the page in ma is
dependent on the write policy in use (mem[ma := page]pol
updates the page in ma with page in write-through policies,
and it leaves it unchanged in write-back ones).
Action new_sm stealth va pa
Add stealth va 7→ ma to stealth memory of active OS
Rule
aos act = (aos, waiting)
oss[aos] = (pa′, New stealth va pa)
get page hyp(t, aos, pa) = (ma, pg)
pg = (RW ,OS aos, true)
¬memory alias(mem, stealth va,ma)
get page hyp(t, aos, pa′) = (ma′, cpt)
cpt[stealth va] = ∅
oss[aos := (pa′, None)] = oss′
cpt[stealth va := ma] = cpt′
mem[ma′ := cpt′] = mem′
cache add(cache, stealth va,ma, pg) = (cache′, )
tlb[stealth va := ma] = tlb′
t = (oss, aos act, hyp,mem, cache, tlb)
t′ = (oss′, aos act, hyp,mem′, cache′, tlb′)
t ֒
new_sm stealth va pa
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t
′
Precondition The action new_sm stealth va pa requires
that the active OS aos is waiting for the hypervisor to ex-
tend its current page table cpt with stealth va. The physical
address pa maps to the machine address ma and page pg in
the hypervisor mapping of aos (get page hyp). This page
pg must be readable/writable and cacheable. Also, no page
table can map a virtual address to ma (no memory alias),
and stealth va is not mapped in cpt. This is needed in order
to guarantee that the stealth page pg in ma is always cached
and that no aliased pages are cached.
Postcondition In the resulting state, the pending hypercall
of aos is removed. The current page table cpt and tlb are up-
dated with the mapping of stealth va to ma. Furthermore,
the new stealth page is immediately stored in cache.
Figure 10: Semantics of write and new sm actions
